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FAILURE OF THE COURTS TO RECOGNIZE 
STUDENTS’ SEVERE EMOTIONAL HARM AS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
EMILY F. SUSKI* 
ABSTRACT 
Sometimes the very people who are supposed to teach, nurture, and 
protect students in public schools—the students’ teachers, principals, 
coaches, and other school officials—are instead the people who harm 
them. Public school officials have beaten students, causing significant 
physical harm. They have also left students suffering from depression, 
suicidal ideation, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. When school 
officials cause such severe harm to students, all the federal courts of 
appeals to consider the issue have concluded that the Fourteenth 
Amendment at least in theory protects them, regardless of whether the 
form of the harm is emotional or physical. Yet, an analysis of the cases 
across the circuits reveals that the courts have yet to actually find that a 
case of severe emotional harm on its own violates the Constitution, even 
though they have been willing to find physical harm unconstitutional. Not 
only do the courts not find stand-alone emotional harm sufficient to make 
out a constitutional violation, they also collectively evaluate students’ 
emotional harm very differently than their physical harm.  
This Article explores the distinction in the way the courts treat stand-
alone emotional harm in public school students’ Fourteenth Amendment 
cases. It contends that if the courts are going to recognize that the 
Constitution protects students from severe harm regardless of its physical 
or emotional form, as they do, then the distinction in treatment of 
emotional harm is untenable. Drawing on substantive due process theory, 
psychology, and law and emotions theory, this Article argues that the 
distinction in treatment is the result of emotions stigma, analogous to the 
long-recognized phenomenon of mental illness stigma, that discredits 
students’ emotions-based claims. It proposes a paradigm for evaluating 
students’ emotional harm that responds to and helps to overcome 
emotions stigma so the Constitution will protect students when school 
officials cause them severe emotional harm. 
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In T.W. v. School Board of South Seminole County,1 T.W., a student with autism, 
developmental delays, anxiety, and other psychological disabilities, suffered severe 
emotional harm as the result of abuse by his teacher, Kathleen Garrett.2 Over a 
period of several months, Garrett taunted T.W. and called him vulgar names, 
including “lazy, an asshole, a pig, and a jerk.”3 Garrett would provoke T.W. into 
acting out by “pick[ing] and nag[ging] at him until he would just get to the point 
where he couldn’t take it anymore” and would act out.4 Then Garrett would 
physically restrain him.5 Garrett restrained T.W. even though she knew from 
psychological evaluations that physical restraints would be counterproductive as a 
disciplinary method and could cause T.W. psychological harm.6 As a result of 
Garrett’s abuse, T.W. did suffer psychological harm. His psychological disabilities 
got worse.7 His maladaptive behaviors intensified. He began “‘urinating all over the 
place.’”8 He would cry on his way to and from school.9 He also developed symptoms 
of a new disability, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”), and he ultimately 
dropped out of school entirely because of Garrett’s abuse.10 Despite this harm and an 
acknowledgement that emotionally harming students could violate the Constitution, 
the Eleventh Circuit found the infliction of emotional harm on T.W. to be 
constitutional.11  
When public school officials harm students either emotionally or physically, it 
can implicate the students’ substantive due process rights.12 The T.W. outcome 
notwithstanding, all of the federal courts of appeals that have heard students’ claims 
have concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment protects them from severe harm 
imposed by school officials.13 In doing so, the courts have found students’ physical 
                                                                                                                                            
 1 T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of S. Seminole Cnty., 610 F.3d 588 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 2 Id. at 593. 
 3 Id. at 594. 
 4 Id.  
 5 Id.  
 6 Id. at 608 n.6.  
 7 Id. at 596. 
 8 Id.  
 9 Id.  
 10 Id.  
 11 Id. at 602. 
 12 Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 611 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding that excessive corporal 
punishment in school violates students’ substantive due process rights).  
 13 Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001); Metzger v. 
Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520 (3d Cir. 1988); Hall, 621 F.2d at 611; Webb v. McCullough, 828 
F.2d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1987); Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 
1988); P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1304 (9th Cir. 1996); Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. Miera, 817 
F.2d 650, 655 (10th Cir. 1987); Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th 
Cir. 2000). The Fifth Circuit recognizes “a student's liberty interest in maintaining bodily 
integrity” but will find it violated only in the absence of any legitimate state interest, such as a 
disciplinary interest. Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 2000). The 
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harm unconstitutional.14 No federal court of appeals, however, has found a student’s 
severe emotional harm alone unconstitutional.15  
This lack of stand-alone success does not represent a wholesale refusal by the 
courts to acknowledge that emotional harm meted out by public school officials 
                                                                                                                                            
First and District of Columbia Circuits have not heard a case based on a student’s substantive 
due process claims. In Wallace by Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th 
Cir. 1995), the Seventh Circuit considered facts giving rise to both a Fourth Amendment 
unreasonable seizure claim and a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim. It 
analyzed and rejected the claim under the Fourth Amendment and did not address the 
Fourteenth Amendment claim in any substantive way. Id. The Supreme Court has never ruled 
on the matter. However, it denied certiorari in the Tenth Circuit case Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. 
Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 655 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988). In Garcia, the 
Court concluded that students have “‘the right to be free of state intrusions into realms of 
personal privacy and bodily security through means so brutal, demeaning, and harmful as 
literally to shock the conscience of a court.’” Id. at 655 (quoting Hall, 621 F.2d at 613).  
 14 See, e.g., Johnson, 239 F.3d at 252 (finding allegations that a gym teacher dragged a 
student across the gym floor, choked him, and slammed his head against the bleachers 
sufficient to make out a substantive due process claim); Metzger, 841 F.2d at 519-20 
(allegations that a teacher held student from behind in such a way that the student lost 
consciousness and broke his nose sufficient for a substantive due process case); Hall, 621 F.2d 
at 613 (allegations of paddling at school established a substantive due process claim); Webb, 
828 F.2d at 1154 (allegations that principal grabbed a student, slapped her, and threw her 
against bathroom wall made out a substantive due process claim); P.B., 96 F.3d at 1299 
(allegations a principal slapped, punched, and choked students sufficient for a substantive due 
process claim); Garcia, 817 F.2d at 655) (finding allegations that a principal beat a student 
twice with a split wood paddle established a substantive due process claim); Neal, 229 F.3d 
1076-77 (allegations that a coach hit a student in the eye with a metal lock, resulting in the 
loss of the eye, made out a substantive due process claim). Although the federal courts of 
appeals have been thus far unwilling to find students’ emotional harm unconstitutional, some 
federal district courts have been willing to find allegations of emotional harm unconstitutional. 
See, e.g. W.E.T. v. Mitchell, No. 1:06CV487, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68376, at *17 (E.D.N.C 
Sept. 14, 2007) (explicitly finding that allegations of severe mental and emotional harm meet 
the severe injury requirement for a student’s substantive due process claim).  
 15 Seven of the nine Circuits that have heard students’ substantive due process claims have 
reviewed cases in which the claims have been based in whole or in part on allegations of 
emotional harm. Johnson, 239 F.2d at 252; H.H. v. Moffett, 335 Fed. Appx. 306, 309 (4th Cir. 
2009); Meeker v. Edmunson, 415 F.3d 317, 319 (4th Cir. 2005); Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303, 305-06 (5th Cir. 1987); Costello v. Mitchell, 266 F.3d 916, 920-21 
(8th Cir. 2001); P.B., 96 F.3d at 1304; Abeyta ex rel. Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 77 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 1996); T.W. v. Sch. Bd. of S. Seminole Cnty., 610 
F.3d 588, 601 (11th Cir. 2010). None of the claims have been successful on the basis of 
emotional harm alone. The Fifth Circuit in Jefferson heard the substantive due process claim 
of a student who alleged only emotional harm as a result of being tied to a chair in school for 
nearly two days, and the Court let it go forward. Jefferson, 817 F.2d at 304-05. However, the 
Court based its conclusion solely on the conduct of the school officials in physically 
restraining the student and did not consider the emotional harm alleged. Id. Later, the Fifth 
Circuit reiterated that it did not decide "whether non-physical injuries (which are all that were 
alleged in Jefferson, although the claimed constitutional wrongs clearly involved prolonged 
physical distress) would satisfy the . . . ‘severe injury’ requirement. Instead, we focused on the 
outrageous [physical] conduct of the defendants.” Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 906 (5th Cir. 
1998). 
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could violate students’ substantive due process rights.16 Indeed, two circuits have 
explicitly recognized that stand-alone emotional harm inflicted on students could 
theoretically be unconstitutional.17 Others have implicitly recognized it as 
unconstitutional.18 Yet even in cases like T.W., where the emotional harm alleged 
was very severe and as or more severe than physical harm alleged in meritorious 
substantive due process claims, the theoretical has not become the actual: emotional 
harm is still found insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.19  
This Article draws and expands upon relevant scholarship, including substantive 
due process theory, law and emotions, and psychology, to argue that students like 
T.W. who suffer severe stand-alone emotional harm at the hands of public school 
officials should be more than theoretically protected by the Constitution.20 The 
courts’ distinction in treatment between emotional and physical harm is untenable 
and reflects that an emotions stigma is at work in these cases. What this Article calls 
“emotions stigma” is analogous to the long-recognized phenomenon of mental 
illness stigma.21 It is the skeptical, even negative, view of the operation of emotions 
and emotional harm that discredits emotions-based legal claims. Emotions stigma is 
rooted in the historic understanding of reason as capable of taming emotions and is 
                                                                                                                                            
 16 Even in rejecting specific allegations of emotional harm brought by public school 
students, the courts have acknowledged psychological harm could make out a Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty interest claim. For example, in Abeyta, the Tenth Circuit rejected a 
student’s substantive due process claim based in emotional harm but stated, “we are unwilling 
to hold that actions which inflict only psychological damage may never achieve the high level 
of ‘a brutal and inhuman abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience,’ 
necessary to constitute a substantive due process violation.” Abeyta, 77 F.3d at 1257-58 
(quoting Hall, 621 F.2d at 613). 
 17 Id. at 1257-58; T.W., 610 F.3d at 601-02. Significantly, no Circuit has found that 
emotional harm could never violate students’ substantive due process rights. 
 18 The courts have implicitly recognized emotional harm violates the Constitution by 
finding concomitant allegations of both physical and emotional harm sufficient to make out a 
substantive due process claim. See infra note 64.  
 19 See, e.g., T.W., 610 F.3d at 602.  
 20 See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and Emotions, 94 MINN. 
L. REV. 1997 (2010); William J. Brennan, Reason, Passion, and “The Progress of the Law”, 
10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3 (1988–89); David B. Feldman & Christian S. Crandall, Dimensions of 
Mental Illness Stigma: What About Mental Illness Causes Social Rejection?, 26 J. OF SOC. & 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 137 (2007); Doni Gewirtzman, Our Founding Feelings: Emotion, 
Commitment, and Imagination in Constitutional Culture, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 623 (2009); 
Terry A. Maroney, Essay, The Persistent Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 CAL. L. REV. 629 
(2011) [hereinafter Maroney, Judicial Dispassion]; Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common 
Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 851 (2009) [hereinafter Maroney, Common 
Sense]; Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. 
REV. 1049 (2006); Bernard Weiner, Raymond P. Perry & Jamie Magnusson, An Attributional 
Analysis of Reactions to Stigmas, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 738 (Nov. 1988). 
 21 Mental illness stigma is the perception of persons with mental illnesses as other. 
Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, supra note 20, at 738-39. One of its primary causes is a lay 
perception that the responsibility for mental illness lies with the individual with mental illness. 
Id. One of its primary effects is a desire to achieve social distance from the person with mental 
illness. Id.  
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evidenced in courts’ shallow analyses of students’ emotional harm claims. By 
naming and defining emotions stigma, this Article seeks to make it visible so it can 
be raised and overcome. It also aims to fill a hole in legal scholarship that has yet to 
identify the distinct treatment of emotional harm in students’ substantive due process 
cases.22 
Part I of this Article explores specifically how the federal courts of appeals have 
treated students’ emotional harm differently than their physical harm and why that is 
problematic. It begins by explaining the liberty interest at stake in students’ 
substantive due process cases and the standard for determining when it has been 
violated, regardless of whether students raise emotional or physical harm allegations. 
Even though that standard is ostensibly the same for students’ physical and 
emotional harm, and the courts implicitly or explicitly recognize that emotionally 
harming students could violate the Constitution, emotional harm on its own has 
never been found unconstitutional. This Part identifies the problems that result from 
this distinction in treatment to show that the Constitution should protect students 
from severe stand-alone emotional harm. Part II analyzes potential rationales for 
why the federal courts of appeals treat students’ emotional and physical harm 
distinctly and rejects those rationales as inadequate to explain the treatment of 
emotional harm. It then offers an alternative explanation for the federal courts of 
appeals’ collective treatment of emotional harm in students’ substantive due process 
cases—it contends that an emotions stigma is at work in the courts’ decisions. Part 
III proposes ways to overcome emotions stigma by offering a paradigm for 
evaluating students’ emotional harm that works within the existing analytic 
framework for assessing students’ substantive due process claims. It also advocates 
for raising emotions stigma in students’ substantive due process litigation.  
I. A COLLECTIVE DISTINCTION IN TREATMENT ACROSS THE CIRCUITS: EMOTIONAL 
AND PHYSICAL HARM IN STUDENTS’ SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS 
Although any public school student who asserts a substantive due process claim 
faces an uphill battle to survive even summary judgment,23 physical harm allegations 
have surmounted that hurdle. Emotional harm allegations on their own have not. 
This is true even though the federal courts of appeals recognize that both physical 
and emotional harm of students by school officials could violate the Constitution. 
While the federal courts of appeals have not heard vast numbers of these cases, the 
                                                                                                                                            
 22 A great deal of scholarship has directly or indirectly addressed the emotional harm 
imposed by students on other students through cyber bullying. See, e.g., Matthew Fenn, A 
Web of Liability: Does New Cyberbullying Legislation Put Public Schools in a Sticky 
Situation?, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2729 (2013); Douglas E. Abrams, Recognizing the Public 
Schools' Authority to Discipline Students' Off-Campus Cyberbullying of Classmates, 37 NEW 
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 181 (2011); Renee L. Servance, Cyberbullying, Cyber-
harrassment, and the Conflict Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 
1213 (2003). However, very little scholarship has addressed the emotional harm of students by 
school officials. See, e.g., Lewis M. Wasserman, Corporal Punishment in K-12 Public School 
Settings: Reconsideration of its Constitutional Dimensions Thirty Years After Ingraham v. 
Wright, 26 TOURO L. REV. 1029 (2011). 
 23 A student must allege facts to support a finding that a school official’s actions “literally 
. . . shock the conscience,” a high bar. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980); see 
also Abeyta ex rel. Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 77 F.3d 1253, 1257 
(10th Cir. 1996) (noting the “shock the conscience” bar is a “high level”). 
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cases they have heard establish a pattern of distinct treatment of students’ emotional 
harm. As this Part will show, the distinction in treatment leaves students who suffer 
even severe, unavoidable emotional harm at the hands of state officials, the very type 
of the harm the Constitution is uniquely capable of addressing, virtually unprotected 
by the Constitution. First, though, the Part will explain students’ substantive due 
process rights in school and how those rights apply at least in theory to both 
emotional and physical harm.  
A. Students’ Substantive Due Process Rights in School 
In Ingraham v. Wright, the Supreme Court concluded that public school students 
subjected to corporal punishment have Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests 
giving rise to procedural due process rights.24 In Ingraham, the Supreme Court left 
open the question of “whether or under what circumstances corporal punishment of a 
public school child may give rise to an independent federal cause of action to 
vindicate substantive rights under the Due Process Clause.”25 Since then, the vast 
majority—i.e., nine—of the federal circuit courts have heard cases where students 
have alleged that school officials violated their substantive due process rights.26 All 
have found students to have substantive due process rights in school.27 All but one of 
those courts28 have followed the seminal Fourth Circuit case Hall v. Tawney in both 
                                                                                                                                            
 24 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 683 (1977). The Court went on to find that the state 
of Florida had sufficient common law “constraints and remedies” in place to satisfy the 
procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 682-83.  
 25 Id. at 679 n.47.  
 26 See supra text accompanying notes 12-15. 
 27 Id.; Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 251-52 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(finding students have a “constitutional ‘right to be free from the use of excessive force’” in 
school (quoting Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 476 (2d Cir. 1995)); Metzger v. Osbeck, 
510 F.2d 518, 520 (3d Cir. 1988) (determining that “a decision to discipline a student, if 
accomplished through excessive force and appreciable physical pain, may constitute . . . a 
violation of substantive due process prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment”); Webb v. 
McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d at 613, 
in identifying that “‘the right of students to be free of state intrusions into realms of personal 
privacy and bodily security through means so brutal, demeaning, and harmful as literally to 
shock the conscience’”); Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855, F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(concluding that “at some point the administration of corporal punishment may violate a 
student's liberty interest in his personal security and substantive due process rights”); P.B. v. 
Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[E]xcessive force by a principal against a 
student violated the student’s constitutional rights. The Fourteenth Amendment protects 
against the government’s interference with ‘an individual’s bodily integrity.’” (quoting 
Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc))); Garcia ex rel. Garcia 
v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 655 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988) (finding 
students have “‘the right to be free of state intrusions into realms of personal privacy and 
bodily security through means so brutal, demeaning, and harmful as literally to shock the 
conscience of a court’” (quoting Hall, 621 F.2d at 613)); Neal v. Fulton Cty. Bd. of Ed., 229 
F.3d 1069, 1075 (concluding that when “an exercise of corporal punishment is ‘so brutal, 
demeaning, and harmful as to literally shock the conscience of the court’ . . . a student’s 
substantive due process rights are implicated” (quoting Hall, 621 F.2d at 613)).  
 28 See supra text accompanying note 15 (explaining the Fifth Circuit’s substantive due 
process decisions with respect to claims by public school students).  
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defining the right and, with some minimal variation,29 the elements for analyzing 
whether a school official has violated it.30  
In Hall, the Fourth Circuit heard a substantive due process claim based on 
allegations of excessive corporal punishment in school. The Court concluded that 
students have “the right to be free of state intrusions into realms of personal privacy 
and bodily security through means so brutal, demeaning, and harmful as literally to 
shock the conscience.”31 The Court grounded its conclusions in the understanding 
that “the existence of this right to ultimate bodily security the most fundamental 
aspect of personal privacy is unmistakably established in our constitutional decisions 
as an attribute of ordered liberty.”32 The Hall Court, however, also observed “that 
the substantive due process right is quite different than a claim of assault and battery 
under tort law.”33 It noted that “not every violation of state tort and criminal assault 
laws will be a violation of [substantive due process], but some of course may be.”34 
To determine whether this right has been violated, Hall directed that courts should 
inquire into: 
Whether the force applied [by the school official] caused injury so severe, 
was so disproportionate to the need presented, and was inspired by malice 
or sadism rather than a merely unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a 
brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the 
conscience.35 
Although Hall involved allegations of excessive corporal punishment, its 
progeny in the Fourth Circuit and beyond have followed it irrespective of whether 
the case involved corporal punishment.36 Whether a school official acts to discipline 
                                                                                                                                            
 29 For a review of courts’ use of the Hall standard in corporal punishment cases 
specifically, see Wasserman, supra note 22. 
 30 Johnson, 239 F.3d at 252 (citing Hall in setting forth the factors to be considered in 
students’ excessive force claims); Metzger, 510 F.2d at 620 (citing Hall in finding the 
substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment implicated); Webb, 828 F.2d 
at 1158 (quoting Hall in full when setting forth the substantive right and the factors to be 
considered in determining a student’s substantive due process claim); Wise, 844 F.2d at 564 
(citing Hall in finding a substantive due process right for students in school and in setting 
forth the factors to consider in evaluating whether it was violated); P.B., 96 F.3d at 1302 
(citing Hall in setting forth that students have a substantive due process liberty right to bodily 
integrity in school); Garcia, 817 F.2d at 655 (quoting Hall in “defining the constitutional tort” 
and the factors for determining it); Neal, 229 F.3d at 1075 (quoting Hall in defining the 
substantive due process right and citing Hall in outlining the factors to consider in assessing it, 
though separating them in to objective and subjective components).  
 31 Hall, 621 F.2d at 613. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id.  
 34 Id.  
 35 Id.  
 36 The courts often fail to even make a point of distinguishing whether the acts in question 
were for the purpose of corporal punishment or not—they simply apply the Hall test. See, e.g., 
Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 251-52 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding a 
substantive due process right under the Hall test without discussing whether the test applies to 
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or not, if the actions transgress “the right to be free of state intrusions into realms of 
personal privacy and bodily security” through means that shock the conscience, then 
the official has violated a student’s substantive due process rights.37 In addition, the 
courts use the Hall framework irrespective of whether the students have alleged 
physical or emotional harm and have thereby found concomitantly alleged physical 
and emotional harm (but not stand-alone emotional harm) unconstitutional.38 They 
have thus either implicitly or explicitly found that both physical and emotional harm 
of students by state officials could be unconstitutional.  
                                                                                                                                            
actions intended as corporal punishment for disciplinary purposes or not); Meeker v. 
Edmunson, 415 F.3d 317, 319, 321-22 (4th Cir. 2005) (applying the Hall test without 
considering whether beating a wrestling teammate with the approval of a coach was corporal 
punishment); Costello v. Mitchell Pub. Sch. Dist., 266 F.3d 916, 921 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding a 
student’s allegations that a teacher called her names and threw a book at her face insufficient 
to make out a substantive due process claim without regard for whether it was corporal 
punishment or not); P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding a principal’s 
treatment of students sufficient to establish substantive due process claims without 
considering whether the actions were intended as corporal punishment); Abeyta ex rel. 
Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 19, 77 F.3d 1253, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(not finding a constitutional violation based on emotional harm claims but stating “we are 
unwilling to hold that actions which inflict only psychological damage many never achieve 
the high level of ‘a brutal and inhuman abuse of official power literally shocking to the 
conscience’” without regard for whether the harm resulted from corporal punishment). In 
T.W., the student alleged that the verbal abuse he suffered was not corporal punishment, but 
the court did not analyze this contention—it ignored it. T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of S. 
Seminole Cnty., 610 F.3d 588, 598-99 (11th Cir. 2010). It only addressed whether the 
teacher’s physical abuse of T.W. was for the purpose of discipline. Id. It concluded all 
incidents save one potential use of force were for the purpose of discipline and therefore were 
corporal punishment. Id. With respect to the one use of force that may not have been for 
discipline, tripping T.W., the Court stated that it would still apply a “shocks the conscience” 
test even if it were not a disciplinary use of force. Id. It then concluded that use of force did 
not meet that standard without articulating a more precise analysis. Id. 
 37 Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting Hall, 621 F.2d at 
613); see also Nolan v. Nashville City Sch., 589 F.3d 257, 269 (6th Cir. 2009) (reiterating that 
students’ substantive due process rights protect them whether or not a school official acts with 
the purpose of imposing corporal punishment). 
 38 See, e.g., Johnson, 239 F.3d at 252 (noting that “various emotional injuries” were 
included among the injuries alleged by the students, but following the Hall test); Meeker, 415 
F.3d at 319 (noting the student’s abuse resulted in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder treatment, 
among other things, and following Hall to analyze those emotional and also physical harm 
allegations); Costello, 266 F.3d at 920 (noting that the student suffered mentally as a result of 
her treatment in school but not varying the substantive due process analysis in any way based 
on that allegation); P.B., 96 F.3d at 1304 (identifying emotional harm as among the harm 
suffered by the student-plaintiffs as a result of the treatment they received from a school 
official but not changing the analysis as a result); Abeyta, 77 F.3d at1257-58 (acknowledging 
that psychological damage could violate substantive due process if it met the “shock the 
conscience” threshold set by Hall); T.W., 610 F.3d at 598-600 (considering allegations of 
emotional harm but still following Neal v. Fulton Cty. Bd. of Ed., 229 F.3d 1069, which 
followed Hall). 
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B. Different Treatment of Emotional Harm: An Undefined Torture Standard and 
Summary Analyses 
Despite the courts’ implicit or explicit acknowledgement that both emotional and 
physical harm could violate the Constitution and use of the same analytic framework 
for both emotional and physical harm, they treat students’ emotional and physical 
harm in very different ways. Some courts hold students’ emotional harm to a torture 
standard that they do not define. Others fail to do more than summarily analyze the 
emotional harm. Significantly, the courts do not consistently, if ever, treat physical 
harm in either way.39  
1. The Undefined Torture Standard 
Two Circuits, the Tenth and Eleventh, have held students’ emotional, but not 
physical, harm to an undefined torture standard. The Tenth Circuit first articulated 
this undefined standard, and the Eleventh Circuit followed it. In Abeyta v. Chama 
Valley Independent School, the Tenth Circuit heard the claim of a twelve year-old 
girl who alleged that her teacher repeatedly called her a prostitute in front of the 
class for over a month and a half.40 The teacher’s taunts caused her classmates to 
also call her a prostitute repeatedly over the same period of time.41 In rejecting the 
girl’s emotional harm as insufficient to make out a Fourteenth Amendment claim, 
the court did not reject the notion that emotional harm could violate the 
Constitution.42 To the contrary, it stated that it could “imagine a case where 
psychological harassment might be so severe that it would amount to torture equal or 
greater to the stomach pumping abuse condemned [by the Supreme Court] in 
Rochin” and therefore would violate the Constitution.43 Finding that the emotional 
harm did not rise to this level, though, the Court rejected the substantive due process 
claim. 
The Eleventh Circuit followed the Tenth Circuit’s lead in T.W. v. School Board 
of South Seminole County, the case described briefly in this Article’s Introduction. In 
T.W., the Eleventh Circuit held the allegations of emotional harm to the same 
undefined torture standard used by the Tenth Circuit. It quoted the Tenth Circuit in 
                                                                                                                                            
 39 While occasionally courts fail to do more than a cursory analysis of physical harm, they 
also do fully analyze it. For example, in Kirkland v. Greene County Board of Education, the 
Eleventh Circuit analyzed the student’s allegations of physical harm in one sentence. 
Kirkland, 347 F.3d 903, 904 (11th Cir. 2003). However, in T.W. the Eleventh Circuit analyzed 
each instance of physical force independently over the course of multiple paragraphs and 
pages. T.W., 610 F.3d at 599-601. Therefore, the courts’ occasional failure to fully analyze the 
students’ physical harm does not constitute the pattern it does with respect to their treatment 
of emotional harm.  
 40 Abeyta, 77 F.3d at 1254-55. 
 41 Id. The opinion did not detail the harm the student suffered; the opinion only identified 
the harm as psychological harm. Id.  
 42 Id. at 1257-58. 
 43 Id.  
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asserting this vague standard.44 It then rejected the emotional harm in T.W. as 
insufficient to meet it.45  
Neither the Tenth nor Eleventh Circuit defined “torture” in these cases. Both 
courts referenced the stomach pumping found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court 
in Rochin v. California as the sort of behavior that is torture. Rochin is a Fourteenth 
Amendment case in which the Supreme Court reversed a drug conviction because 
the police obtained drug evidence by, among other things, directing that the 
defendant’s stomach be pumped against his will. This Rochin reference, however, is 
largely unhelpful in sussing out what amounts to torture in student substantive due 
process cases. First, the Supreme Court did not term the actions in Rochin 
“torture.”46 Rochin therefore contains no definition or explanation of torture.47 
Second, even if stomach pumping is torture,48 the analogy is unhelpful because 
stomach pumping is physical in nature. Therefore, it provides little guidance as to 
what kind of emotional abuse or harm would amount to torture.  
Equally problematic, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits do not hold physical harm 
to any torture standard—defined or undefined. And both courts have found physical 
harm allegations sufficient to make out a substantive due process violation without 
mention of a torture standard. In Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. Miera, the Tenth Circuit 
first concluded that students have substantive due process rights in school.49 It based 
its conclusions on a nine-year-old girl’s allegations that a principal beat her on two 
                                                                                                                                            
 44 T.W., 610 F.3d at 598. 
 45 Id. at 601-02. Notably, T.W.’s emotional harm could arguably satisfy the definition of 
torture contained in the United Nations Convention Against Torture. The elements of that 
definition are “(1) an act; (2) severe pain or suffering; (3) physical or mental pain; (4) intent; 
(5) particular purposes, including punishment; (6) involvement of a public official; and (7) the 
absence of pain or suffering from lawful sanctions.” GAIL MILLER, DEFINING TORTURE 6 
(2005). Garrett engaged in not one but multiple acts that resulted in T.W. suffering severe 
mental pain, including the development of symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. T.W., 
610 F.3d at 608 n.6. Garrett intended and had the purpose to cause this pain and suffering as 
evidenced both by the fact that she knew from psychological assessments of T.W. that it likely 
would cause it, and she her stated purpose was punishment. Id. at 596, 599. Finally, as a 
public school teacher, Garrett was a public official, and no evidence in the record suggested 
that any law sanctioned the pain and suffering. To the contrary, Garrett was convicted of one 
count of criminal child abuse for her actions. Id. at 597. 
 46 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (petitioner was arrested on suspicion of drug 
possession and sale, taken to the hospital, and while at the hospital doctors pumped his 
stomach at the direction of police in order to determine if he had swallowed illegal drugs).  
 47 Merriam Webster’s Dictionary defines “torture” in two ways: “1 a: anguish of body or 
mind; agony; b: something that causes agony or pain; 2: the infliction of intense pain (as from 
burning, crushing, or wounding) to punish, coerce, or afford sadistic pleasure.” Torture 
Definition, MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/torture?show=0&t=1372823523 (last visited July 2, 2013). Whether the courts 
meant to incorporate some or all of these dictionary definitions is unclear. 
 48 And certainly there is an argument that it does constitute torture. See supra note 45. 
 49 Garcia by Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1987). 
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occasions with a split wood paddle.50 The Court followed Hall in finding that 
students have substantive due process rights in school and the school official’s 
actions in violation of those rights in Garcia.51 In doing so, it made no mention of 
torture.52  
Similarly, in cases such as Neal v. Fulton County Board of Education, Kirkland 
v. Greene County Board of Education, and Hatfield v. O’Neill, the Eleventh Circuit 
has found allegations of physical harm imposed on students by school officials 
sufficient to make out substantive due process violations.53 In all of those cases, the 
students alleged physical abuse as the bases for their substantive due process 
claims.54 In those cases, the Court never identified torture as a requirement for 
finding, as it did, that the students’ harm was unconstitutional.  
2. Summary Analyses 
Even more frequently than the courts hold students’ emotional harm to an 
undefined torture standard, they fail to do anything more than summarily analyze it. 
Of the nine federal courts of appeals that have heard students’ substantive due 
process cases, seven have considered cases alleging some sort of emotional harm.55 
All have summarily analyzed these allegations. Many of the courts reference the 
allegations of emotional harm somewhere in their opinions. Some courts reference 
the alleged emotional harm in the facts.56 Others reference it in their analyses.57 
                                                                                                                                            
 50 The Court based its conclusion on allegations that two beatings of the plaintiff by a 
school official left a permanent scar in one instance and serious bruises and long-lasting pain 
in the second. Id. at 653. 
 51 Id. at 655.  
 52 Id.  
 53 Neal v. Fulton Cty. Bd. of Ed., 229 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000); Kirkland v. Greene Cty. 
Bd. of Ed., 347 F.3d 903 (11th Cir. 2003); Hatfield v. O'Neill, 534 F. App'x 838 (11th Cir. 
2013) (per curiam). 
 54 The student in Neal lost his eye when a coach hit him with a weight lock. Neal, 229 
F.3d at 1071. The student in Kirkland suffered migraines when the principal hit him 
repeatedly with a metal cane. Kirkland, 347 F.3d at 904. The student in Hatfield was hit on 
multiple occasions on her head in the place where she had had a portion of her brain removed, 
causing extreme physical pain. Hatfield, 534 F. App'x 838, 840-41. The student was also 
subjected to emotional abuse by the teacher, who called her “fat ass” and said she was just 
“sucking up oxygen.” Id. at 842. As a result, the student suffered some bruising, vomiting, and 
emotional harm in the form of depression. Id. However, the Court focused on the student’s 
physical harm and injuries to find a substantive due process violation and only considered the 
emotional abuse in concluding the teacher acted with malice. Id. at 847. 
 55 See supra note 15.  
 56 Smith v. Half Hollow Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 168, 170 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting 
the plaintiff suffered “severe emotional pain for which he underwent psychotherapy”); H.H. v. 
Moffett, 335 Fed. Appx. 306, 307 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating the student became “increasingly 
distressed, anxious, and angry about her experiences [at school]” and “would cry or scream” 
as she approached school because she was inappropriately restrained in her wheelchair for 
hours a day); Costello v. Mitchell Pub. Sch. Dist., 266 F.3d 916, 920-21 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(stating the teacher in question called the student “retarded,” stupid,” and “dumb’ in front of 
her classmates, threw a book, and as a result the student suffered depression and suicidal 
ideation). 
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Irrespective of where the courts reference the alleged emotional ham, these mere 
references do not rise to the level of analysis.  
Although the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits do something more than reference the 
allegations of emotional harm in the cases in which they have considered it, both 
have come short of a meaningful analysis of the allegations. As already noted, the 
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have assessed allegations of emotional harm in light of 
an undefined torture standard.58 However, neither engaged in a full analysis of the 
emotional harm alleged. Because the courts both failed to define torture,59 they could 
not and therefore did not explain why the emotional harm in those cases did not meet 
that standard.60 In all other respects, the courts simply ignored the students’ 
allegations of emotional abuse and harm.61  
All of the courts that have barely or summarily analyzed students’ emotional 
harm have engaged in at least a relatively more thorough analysis of students’ 
allegations of physical harm.62 Even when emotional and physical harm allegations 
                                                                                                                                            
 57 Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating in 
the analysis only that “various emotional injuries were inflicted” and nothing more anywhere 
else in the opinion); P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1304 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting a number of the 
ways physical harm was inflicted and suffered but only making one reference in the analysis 
to the “emotional injury” alleged). 
 58 See supra Part I(B)(1). 
 59 See supra Part I(B)(1). 
 60 In T.W., the court’s analysis consisted of one conclusory statement: “after considering 
the totality of the circumstances, including T.W.’s psychological injuries, we conclude that 
Garrett’s conduct was not so arbitrary and egregious as to support a complaint of a violation 
of substantive due process.” T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of S. Seminole Cnty., 610 F.3d 
588, 602 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 61 The courts totally failed to apply the emotional abuse and harm to the elements of the 
Hall test. The Tenth Circuit did not assess the alleged emotional abuse of the student in light 
of its proportionality, as required by the Hall test it cited as its standard. Abeyta ex rel. 
Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 19, 77 F.3d 1253, 1256-58 (10th Cir. 1996). 
Although the Eleventh Circuit assessed the need for physical force and the proportionality of 
the physical force used in T.W., it completely ignored emotional abuse inflicted on T.W. in 
analyzing these factors. T.W., 610 F.3d at 599-602. 
 62 In cases where students allege both physical and emotional harm and ultimately prevail, 
the courts rely on the physical harm to find in favor of the students. Johnson, 239 F.3d at 252 
(2d Cir. 2001) (relying almost entirely on the “extremely violent” conduct of the school 
official and detailing the physical harm of “head trauma, lacerations, and bruising . . . 
requiring hospital treatment” but noting no more than “various emotional injuries were 
inflicted”); H.H., 335 Fed. App’x. at 314 (relying entirely on the fact that a child was 
restrained in a chair for long periods of time to find a constitutional violation even though the 
facts set forth emotional injury, including that the student became “increasingly distressed, 
anxious, and angry” and would “cry or scream” when approaching school); P.B. v. Koch, 96 
F.3d 1298, 1304 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the principal’s behavior caused “emotional 
injury” but emphasizing the “slapping, punching, and choking” in finding a substantive due 
process claim was sufficiently alleged). 
In cases where students allege physical and emotional harm and do not succeed in making out 
a substantive due process violation, the courts also rely on physical harm and summarily 
analyze or ignore the emotional harm. See, e.g., Smith, 298 F.3d at 173 (noting the lack of any 
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are brought in the same case, courts still analyze and rely virtually exclusively on 
physical harm allegations to decide the cases.63 Relying on allegations of physical 
harm and largely or totally ignoring emotional harm means the constitutionality of 
government actions against students in school will be measured by the physical harm 
alone.  
C. The Resulting Problematic Jurisprudential Landscape 
Treating emotional harm differently than physical harm, the Circuit Courts have 
yet to find any student’s stand-alone emotional harm sufficient to make out a 
substantive due process violation. They have therefore denied students who suffer 
severe emotional harm in school the unique protections offered by the Constitution. 
If the courts are going to recognize that severe harm of students by the State can 
violate the Constitution no matter its emotional or physical form, which they do, 
then the distinction in treatment of emotional harm is not sustainable or fair. It 
denies students suffering severe emotional harm the protections of the Constitution 
and effectively allows severe emotional harm of students to go unchecked by the 
very constitutional rules that are designed to protect against such abuse of state 
authority.64 
1. Leaving Students’ Emotional Harm Categorically Lacking in Constitutional 
Significance 
The Constitution and, in particular, substantive due process, protects individuals 
from abuses of government authority.65 Unlike mere torts that protect individuals 
from harms wrought by other individuals in their own capacity,66 the Constitution 
“asks whether the government has treated someone fairly.”67 When the State—either 
                                                                                                                                            
justification for the physical harm—a slap—and thereby analyzing its need and severity but 
not assessing the alleged “severe emotional pain for which [the student] underwent 
psychotherapy” at all before concluding the student had not made out a substantive due 
process violation); Costello, 266 F.3d at 921 (analyzing none of the harm specifically but 
simply stating the teacher’s behavior in calling the student “retarded,” stupid,” and “dumb’ in 
front of her classmates and throwing a book at her was not “sufficiently shocking to the 
conscience” without explaining why the student’s consequent depression and suicidal ideation 
did not support her substantive due process claim). 
 63 Id. T.W. provides a clear example of this distinct treatment. In contrast to its evaluation 
of T.W.’s emotional harm, which the Court did not analyze in terms of need or 
proportionality, the Court analyzed each of the five instances of physical restraint imposed on 
T.W. in detail, identifying needs for the physical restraints and assessing their proportionality 
and harm. Supra note 36. The Court found the physical force and harm alleged insufficient to 
establish a constitutional violation because it found a need for, a proportionality to, and 
minimal harm from it. Id. 
 64 Although tort can remedy the abuse as between two individuals, the abuse of 
government authority vis-à-vis the individual cannot be remedied in tort. See infra note 66.  
 65 Brennan, supra note 20, at 15-15. 
 66 DANIEL B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (West Pub., Minnesota 2002). Dobbs 
emphasizes the “essence of tort is the defendant’s potential for civil liability to the victim for 
harmful wrongdoing and correspondingly the victim’s potential for compensation or other 
relief.” Id.  
 67 Brennan, supra note 20, at 16. 
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through the action of an individual state actor or otherwise—treats someone in a 
significantly unfair way, the Constitution serves “as a last line of defense against 
those literally outrageous abuses of official power.”68 Moreover, the possibility of a 
lawsuit under the auspices of the Constitution provides “an incentive for government 
agents to operate within the confines of their prescribed authority and as a remedy 
for vindicating federal civil rights.”69  
The collective failure by the federal courts of appeals to find that students’ stand-
alone emotional harm violates the Constitution essentially means almost no or no 
amount of emotional harm imposed on students by school officials will rise to the 
level of an unconstitutional abuse of government power. Students’ severe emotional 
harm, therefore, is just a matter between two individuals. In addition, for practical 
purposes, students who suffer only emotional harm at the hands school officials lack 
the “last line” of defense provided by the Constitution. School officials consequently 
lack the constitutional incentive to “operate within the confines of their prescribed 
authority” if the harm they inflict is only severe emotional harm.70  
This ineffective treatment of students’ emotional harm also means that when 
school officials impose severe emotional harm on students, state interests 
consistently trump students’ interests. The assessment of substantive due process 
claims involves a weighing of state interests against the individual’s interests.71 State 
interests are framed in terms of schools’ need to maintain discipline and order.72 
Student interests are their right to personal privacy and bodily integrity.73 The courts’ 
treatment of emotional harm, therefore, consistently orders discipline in schools as 
more important than students’ interests in their own emotional integrity, no matter 
how severely it is infringed.  
The result of leaving an entire category of harm by the constitutional wayside is 
that the only meaningful harmful contact in a constitutional sense between a public 
school official and a student is physical.74 The Constitution recognizes students’ 
severe physical harm, but it does not recognize their severe emotional harm. This 
dichotomy devalues emotional harm and the students who suffer it. 
                                                                                                                                            
 68 Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 69 Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 70 Of course the officials may be liable in tort, but again tort does not hold government 
officials in their capacity as representatives of the state to the limits of their authority. It 
proscribes unlawful conduct between two individuals. See supra note 66.  
 71 Hall called for an assessment of the need for force, which involves identifying the 
government interest in the action, and the harm, which involves identifying the degree to 
which a student interest in bodily integrity was transgressed. Hall, 621 F.2d at 613. 
 72 Hall made clear the state’s interest in “maintaining order in the schools” when 
concluding the parents of the student in question had no right to exempt their child from 
disciplinary corporal punishment in school. Id. at 610.  
 73 Id. at 613. 
 74 Nancy Levitt, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136 (1992). As Nancy Levitt has 
pointed out in discussing emotional and mental distress torts, this outcome creates a 
“mythology about what qualifies as valid injuries. Injuries—to be considered “real”—must be 
physical, visible, or discernible.” Id. at 174. 
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2. Unavoidability 
These constitutional protections from abuses of government authority are 
particularly necessary because when school officials inflict emotional harm on 
students, the students cannot avoid it. Every state has a compulsory public school 
attendance law. 75 The vast majority of students attend public schools in order to 
comply with these laws.76 For those students, then, the infliction of emotional harm 
in school is virtually unavoidable.77 Public school students are at the mercy of state 
                                                                                                                                            
 75 Compulsory attendance laws are codified in each of the fifty states. ALA. CODE § 16-28-
3 (2012); ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.010 (2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-802 (LexisNexis 2012); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-201 (2009); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West 2006); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 22-33-104 (2012); CON. GEN. STAT. § 10-184 (2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2702 
(2007); FLA. STAT. § 1003.21 (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690.1 (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 302A-1132 (1996); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-202 (2009); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/26-1 
(2009); IND. CODE § 20-33-2-6 (2005); IOWA CODE § 299.1A (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-
1111 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.010 (West 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:221 
(2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5001-A (2009); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-301 
(West 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 76, § 1 (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1561 (2009); 
MINN. STAT. § 120A.22 (2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91 (2009); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 167.031 (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-102 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-201 
(West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.040 (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193.1 
(2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:38-25 (West 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-12-2 (2007); N.Y. 
EDUC. LAW § 3205 (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 15.1-20-01 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.01 (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 10-
105 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.010 (2012); 22 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11-13 (2012); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 16-19-1 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-65-10 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-27-1 
(2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3001 (2003); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.085 (West 2007); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-101 (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1121 (2009); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 22.1-254 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.225.010 (1998); W. VA. CODE § 18-
8-1(a) (2010); WIS. STAT. § 118.15 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-102 (2010). Students can 
avoid attendance at traditional public schools if their parents opt to send them to alternatives 
such as charter schools or homeschools. See, e.g., D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational 
Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc). Significantly, these options do not exist 
for every student. Parents who have work obligations cannot homeschool their children, and 
charter schools have limited enrollment. 
 76 Of course some students attend home schools or private schools. However, the number 
of students attending home schools or private schools remains relatively very low compared to 
the number of students in public schools. According to the most recent data available, in the 
2010-2011 academic year 49,177,617 students attended public school in the United States. 
Digest of Education Statistics, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, http://nces.ed. 
gov/pubs2012/pesschools10/tables/table_03.asp. In 2007, the most recent year for which 
information is available, approximately 1.5 million students attended home schools. Digest of 
Education Statistics, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/ 
programs/digest/d11/tables/dt11_040.asp. In the 2009-2010 academic year, also the most 
recent year for which data is available, 4,700,119 children attended private schools. 
 77 Students could skip school to avoid the harm, but then they or their parents face 
potential punishment through truancy laws. ALA. CODE §§ 16-28-1 to -24; ALASKA STAT. 
§§ 14.30.010 to .047; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-802; ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-201; CAL. 
EDUC. CODE §§ 48200 to 48361; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 22-33-104, -107, -107.5, -108; CONN. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 10-184 to -202f; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 2702 to 2706; D.C. CODE §§ 38-
201 to -209; FLA. STAT. §§ 1003.21 to .29; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-2-690.1; HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 302A-1132; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 33-201 to -212; 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-1 to -16; IND. 
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officials for their psychological well being in school. Yet as the jurisprudence now 
stands, when officials abuse that authority the Constitution is not offended. 
Given the degree of emotional harm that can occur when students are abused in 
school by school officials, these results are untenable. Students’ emotional harm can 
take the form of debilitating psychological disabilities as it did in T.W. As a result of 
months of repeated verbal and emotional abuse by his teacher,78 T.W. “had trouble 
sleeping, became stressed, developed trust issues and panic attacks.”79 Eventually, 
T.W. dropped out of school as a result of the emotional harm he suffered in Garrett’s 
classroom, resulting in loss of educational attainment.80 This kind of harm can last 
years, far longer than many forms of physical harm, as students relive the emotional 
harm in their memories.81 In addition, if a student drops out of school as a result of 
emotional harm suffered in school, the economic harm can be substantial.82 If a 
                                                                                                                                            
CODE ANN. §§ 20-33-2-5 to -47; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 299.1 to .24; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-
1111; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 159.010 to .270; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.221 to .226; ME. 
REV. STAT. tit. 20(A), § 5001(A); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-301; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 76, 
§§ 1 to 4; MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 380.1561 to .1599; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 120a.22 to 
120a.36; MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91 (amended 2013); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 167.031 to .111; 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 20-5-101 to -111; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-201 to -210; NEV. REV. STAT. 
§§ 392.040 to .125; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193:1, :7, :16 to :18; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18a: 
38-25 to -36; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-12-2, -7 to -9; N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 3201 to 3234; N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 115c-378 to -383; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15.1-20-01 to -04; OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 3321.01 to .13; OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 10-105; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 339.010 to .110; 24 
PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1326 to -1339; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 16-19-1 to -10; S.C. CODE ANN. 
§§ 59-65-10 to -90; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 13-27-1 to -29; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-6-3005 
to -3019; TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 25.085 to .0952; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11-101 to -
106; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 1121 to 1130; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-254 to -269.1; WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.225.010; W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1; WIS. STAT. §§ 118.15 to .163; WYO. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4-101 to -107. So their choice, then, is to either suffer severe emotional 
harm or the consequences of violating compulsory education laws. 
 78 Although the use of the term “abuse” has specific legal meaning, and in fact Garrett was 
found guilty by a jury of one count of child abuse because of her actions in T.W.’s classroom, 
here the term is used because the Court termed Garrett’s behaviors “abusive.” T.W. ex rel. 
Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of S. Seminole Cnty., 610 F.3d 588, 594 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 79 Id. at 596. T.W. also suffered some minor physical harm in the form of bruising. Id. at 
601. Psychologists who evaluated T.W. concluded that “Garrett’s actions ‘aggravated 
[T.W.’s] developmental disability, increasing his anger, and decreasing his adaptive 
functioning.’” Id. T.W. also developed symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Id.  
 80 Two psychologists concluded that T.W. dropped out of school as a direct result of the 
abuse and harm he suffered in Garrett’s classroom. Id.  
 81 Naomi I. Eisenberger, Broken Hearts and Broken Bones: A Neural Perspective on the 
Similarities Between Social and Physical Pain, 21 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCIENCE 
42 (2012) [hereinafter Eisenberger, Broken Hearts]. Neuropsychological evidence shows that 
emotional harm can be longer lasting than physical harm because a person can relive the 
experience of the emotional pain and feel it again. Id. at 45.  
 82 Students who drop out of school in their teens and 20s are “less likely to be active labor 
force participants than their better educated peers, and they frequently experience 
considerably higher unemployment rates when they do seek work. As a consequence, they are 
much less likely to be employed than their better educated peers across the nation.” Andrew 
Sum et al., The Consequences of Dropping Out of High School, Center for Labor Market 
Studies, Northeastern University, at 2 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.northeastern.edu/ 
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student suffering suicidal ideation, as in cases such as Costello v. Mitchell Public 
School District, and follows through on those thoughts, the harm can be total and 
irreparable.83 When the government infringement on students’ personal privacy and 
bodily integrity results in such severe and unavoidable harm, the Constitution should 
protect them. Yet effectively it does not. These results of the courts’ distinction in 
treatment of students’ emotional harm beg the question: Why do the courts treat 
emotional harm differently than physical harm in these cases? 
II. WHY PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS’ CLAIMS BASED ON EMOTIONAL HARM “HAVE 
NOT FARED WELL”84  
The courts have been explicit that students have a very difficult time succeeding 
in substantive due process claims that are based on emotional harm.85 They have 
pointedly observed that the claims “have not fared well.”86 The courts have been less 
explicit, though, about why the claims have not fared well. Possible explanations 
include: that in some cases the courts can rely on physical harm to decide outcomes 
without reaching the emotional harm; a need to protect the Constitution from 
becoming a source for relatively insignificant tort claims; and supporting a policy of 
deference to school officials’ disciplinary authority. Each of these explanations, 
though, is unsatisfactory; therefore, another explanation is necessary. This Part 
concludes by offering emotions stigma as that alternative explanation. 
A. Possible, But Unsatisfactory, Explanations  
1. The Ease and Efficiency of Relying on Sufficiently Severe and Objectively 
Verifiable Physical Harm 
Both the causes and effects of physical harm seem more objectively verifiable 
and therefore easier to assess than those of emotional harm. This ease of assessment 
may explain why courts, when they can, rely on physical harm to decide substantive 
due process claims in favor of students. When a student’s unbroken arm is broken 
immediately following a beating, the cause is apparent. The effects of that beating 
can be objectively verified by looking at an x-ray.  
In contrast, the causes and effects of emotional harm can be less clear. These 
causation problems involve questions about how much psychological distress 
                                                                                                                                            
clms/wp-content/uploads/The_Consequences_of_Dropping_Out_of_High_School.pdf; see 
also Alliance for Excellent Education, The High Cost of School Dropouts: What the Nation 
Pays for Inadequate High Schools, at 1 (Nov. 2011), available at http://all4ed.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/HighCost.pdf (noting the difference in annual pay for a high school 
graduate as compared to a high school dropout: $27,380 versus $19,540 in 2009). In addition, 
“the incidence of institutionalization problems among young high school dropouts was more 
than 63 times higher than among young four year college graduates.” Sum et al., supra at 9. 
These statistics are not limited to students without disabilities; they include students with 
disabilities and apply regardless of ability level. For T.W., then, the loss of a high school 
diploma likely will mean more difficulty with employment and earning an income than if he 
had not dropped out of school. 
 83 Costello v. Mitchell Pub. Sch. Dist., 266 F.3d 916, 920-21 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 84 Dockery v. Barnett, 167 F. Supp. 2d 597, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  
 85 See, e.g., id. 
 86 Id. at 603. 
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students may have had prior to their abuse by school officials.87 In cases where 
students had some psychological distress prior to their abuse by school officials, 
precisely what amount school officials caused can be difficult to determine. In 
addition, individuals, including students, could conceivably fake the effects of 
emotional harm. Malingering, therefore, is a concern.88  
Deciding cases on the basis of objectively verifiable physical harm seems not 
only easier but also more efficient. When the objective evidence of physical harm’s 
causes and effects are simply more obvious and available (x-rays, for example, are 
common), the courts have adequate bases to decide cases. The appellate courts need 
not spend time and resources evaluating emotional harm when the physical harm 
will suffice.  
This line of reasoning, however, provides at best a partial and therefore 
unsatisfactory explanation for the courts’ distinct treatment of emotional harm in 
students’ substantive due process claims. First, although the causes and effects of 
physical harm may be easier to objectively verify than those of emotional harm, the 
causes and effects of emotional harm can be objectively verified. Evidence of 
emotional harm and its severity exists in the form of independent psychological 
examinations and reports.89 In addition, neuroscience has also shown that emotional 
harm can be physically and objectively verified.90 Functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) scans show where emotional pain physically affects the brain.91  
                                                                                                                                            
 87 DOBBS, supra note 66, at § 302. Dobbs notes that emotional distress cases in torts raise 
questions “about how deep-seated it is” and given that “some persons cope with distress better 
than others.” Id. Indeed, for these reasons emotional distress claims were not even recognized 
in the Restatement of Torts until 1965. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM, § Scope (1965). Courts were “wary of opening the 
floodgates to fraudulent, frivolous, and perhaps even marginal lawsuits” based on emotional 
harm in tort. Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress Claims, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 805, 808 (2004). 
 88 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, 
Ch. 8 Scope Note (1965). 
 89 Certainly this was the case in T.W., where two psychological evaluations identified 
T.W.’s post-traumatic stress symptoms, his decreased adaptive behavior, and his school drop 
out to be the result of his treatment in school by his teacher, Kathleen Garrett. T.W. ex rel. 
Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of S. Seminole Cty., 610 F.3d 588, 596 (11th Cir. 2010). Even tort law, 
historically so reticent to recognize emotional distress harms, now acknowledges “the reality 
and existence of [emotional] distress is not in doubt . . . if your child is crushed by a car, we 
can believe you suffered anguish.” DOBBS, supra note 66, at § 302. 
 90 Betsy Grey, Neuroscience and Emotional Harm in Tort Law: Rethinking the American 
Approach to Free-Standing Emotional Distress Claims, 13 L. & NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT 
LEGAL ISSUES 12 (2010). It also shows, therefore, that emotional pain is very much as real as 
physical harm. Id.  
 91 Id. Grey has argued that distinction between emotional and physical pain is false 
because of the changes in the brain that result from emotional pain. Id.; see also Eisenberger, 
Broken Hearts, supra note 81; Naomi I. Eisenberger, Does Rejection Hurt? An fMRI Study of 
Social Exclusion, 302 SCI. 290 (2003) [hereinafter Eisenberger, Rejection].  
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Neuroscientific evidence has also shown that emotional harm can be at least as 
painful as physical harm.92 Through fMRIs, scientists have found that the brain 
processes both types of harm in the same area.93 As one study noted, it “seems 
difficult to imagine these social experiences that do not physically wound us could 
truly lead to the same kind of pain as a broken bone or an aching stomach . . . 
accumulating [neuroscientific] evidence demonstrates that experiences of social and 
physical pain actually rely on some of the same neurobiological and neural 
substrates.”94 Emotional pain can also be more prolonged than physical pain. “While 
individuals can relive the pain of social rejection or betrayal, they are less capable of 
reliving the pain of physical assault or injury.”95  
Courts could, then, achieve efficiency objectives by evaluating emotional harm 
instead of physical harm. When presented with objective evidence of the cause, 
existence, and severity of the emotional harm, the courts save nothing by evaluating 
the physical harm instead of emotional harm.96 In such cases, the evaluation of 
physical harm instead of emotional harm is pure choice.  
Moreover, nothing requires the courts to stop assessing students’ allegations at 
the point of physical harm. To the contrary, the appellate courts arguably should 
evaluate all allegations before them as part of their responsibility to provide 
guidance to lower courts.97 Failing to provide that guidance means that the appellate 
courts will likely have to evaluate allegations of emotional harm later in other cases. 
Evaluating these allegations seriatim is decidedly inefficient.  
2. Protecting the Constitution and the Courts 
The courts may also be wary of finding emotional harm unconstitutional because 
they have an obligation to protect the Constitution and the federal courts from 
becoming a basis for litigating relatively insignificant tort claims. Starting with Hall 
v. Tawney, when courts have evaluated students’ substantive due process claims, 
they have repeatedly emphasized that a violation of substantive due process is 
                                                                                                                                            
 92 Eisenberger, Broken Hearts, supra note 81, at 45 (finding emotional pain in the form of 
social rejection and social loss as severe or more severe in the brain than physical harm). 
 93 Id. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has shown “ a pattern of activation 
very similar to those found in studies of physical pain . . . evidenc[ing] that the experience and 
regulation of social and physical pain share a common neuroanatomical basis.” Eisenberger, 
Rejection, supra note 92, at 291; see also Michael J. Bernstein & Heather M. Claypool, Social 
Exclusion and Pain Sensitivity: Why Exclusion Sometimes Hurts and Sometimes Numbs, 38 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 185 (2012); Ethan Kross et al., Social Rejection Shares 
Somatosensory Representations with Physical Pain, 108 PNAS 6270 (2011). 
 94 Eisenberger, Broken Hearts, supra note 81, at 45.  
 95 Id.  
 96 For example, in T.W. and Meeker, both students developed symptoms of Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder, among other emotional harm, as a result of their treatment by school officials. 
T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of S. Seminole Cty., 610 F.3d 588, 596 (11th Cir. 2010); 
Meeker v. Edmunson, 415 F.3d 317, 319 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 97 The Circuits’ decisions are binding on lower courts within their individual boundaries, 
creating a “law of the circuits” that inevitably provides guidance to the lower courts on what 
the law is and how it applies in certain circumstances. Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior 
Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 855 (1994).  
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different than a tort.98 Since Hall, courts have continued to stress that not just any 
violation of bodily integrity will constitute a substantive due process violation.99 
They underscore that “the Fourteenth Amendment is not a ‘font of tort law’ that can 
be used, through section 1983, to convert state tort law claims into federal causes of 
action.”100 Indeed, when the Eleventh Circuit adopted a version of the Hall test for 
students’ substantive due process claims, it was compelled to assure that “we do not 
open the door to a flood of complaints by objecting to traditional and reasonable 
corporal punishment.”101 It has also stated its responsibility to “remain vigilant in 
policing the boundaries separating tort law from Constitutional law.”102  
The courts’ need to protect the Constitution from misuse and misunderstanding 
arguably serves to explain why emotional harm on its own has yet to successfully 
support a substantive due process claim. Emotional harm is notoriously difficult to 
successfully bring in tort law.103 Although intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claims are recognized, they require proof of more than just some emotional harm. To 
succeed, a plaintiff must show “outrageousness.”104 A showing of outrageousness 
requires proof of actions that are “utterly intolerable and beyond all bounds of 
civilized society.”105 If a showing of this level of conduct is required in tort, then it 
would seem that something more must be required for emotional harm that offends 
the Constitution, making such claims harder to establish successfully.  
The rationale that students’ emotional abuse and harm allegations have not 
succeeded in making out a substantive due process claim because the Constitution is 
not a “font of tort law,” however, also fails to explain the treatment by the federal 
courts of appeals of emotional abuse and harm claims. First, while this principle 
limits overlapping tort and constitutional claims to only the egregious, it does not 
preclude any overlap of tort and substantive due process claims. Tort and substantive 
due process claims are not mutually exclusive.106 While the Supreme Court has 
                                                                                                                                            
 98 Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 99 Abeyta ex rel. Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 19, 77 F.3d 1253, 1258 
(10th Cir. 1996). 
 100 Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 2000).  
 101 Id. at 1076. 
 102 T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of S. Seminole Cty., 610 F.3d 588, 602 (11th Cir. 
2010). 
 103 As previously discussed, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress only 
entered the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS in 1965, and even then the American Law 
Institute “declined to extend the infliction of emotional distress to negligent conduct.” Levitt, 
supra note 74, at 144. However, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS recognizes both 
intentionally and negligently inflicted stand-alone emotional distress, irrespective of any 
physical injury or component. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM, §§ 46-47 (1965). 
 104 DOBBS, supra note 66, at § 304. 
 105 Id. (noting a dean speaking to a faculty member in a “sexist and condescending manner” 
did not constitute “outrageous” behavior). 
 106 As already noted, the Fourth Circuit made the point in Hall that “not every violation of 
state tort and criminal assault laws will be a violation of a constitutional right . . . some of 
course may be.” Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). 
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“rejected the lowest common denominator of customary tort liability” as insufficient 
to make out a substantive due process claim,107 stating that the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not “regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in 
society,” it does protect against some injuries that could be brought as either tort or 
substantive due process claims or both.108 When a state actor in his or her official 
capacity causes severe harm, the matter is not one that is just attendant to living 
together in daily society and that tort can redress. The matter has constitutional 
implications because the State is imposing the harm and the harm is severe.109 So 
while tort actions can redress matters of individual harm,110 when the individual 
causing the harm is also a state actor and the harm is severe, constitutional claims are 
warranted as well.  
Second, this principle has not prevented students’ substantive due process claims 
based on allegations of physical abuse and harm from going forward.111 The courts 
find physical harm unconstitutional while operating within the confines of their 
obligation to protect the Constitution from becoming a “font of tort law.” They 
should then be able to find severe emotional harm unconstitutional and still uphold 
these obligations.  
The rationale that the Constitution must be preserved from becoming a “font of 
tort law” therefore only suffices to explain why emotional harm of the kind 
associated day-to-day living in society does not receive constitutional scrutiny.112 It 
does not explain why severe emotional harm, such as that in T.W., has also not 
survived constitutional scrutiny.113 In addition, the need to protect the Constitution 
also does not explain why courts largely fail to analyze emotional abuse and harm in 
general or hold them to an undefined torture standard not applied to physical harm. 
The courts could still protect the Constitution while also fully analyzing emotional 
abuse and harm and holding them to the same standard as physical harm.  
3. Deference to Schools’ Disciplinary Authority 
Another possible explanation for courts’ distinct treatment of students’ emotional 
harm is that they feel obliged to defer to schools when it comes to matters of 
discipline. The Supreme Court “has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming 
the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with 
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the 
                                                                                                                                            
 107 Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 (1998). 
 108 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986).  
 109 See supra note 13. 
 110 This protection is based on the assumption that the state actors are not protected by 
immunities in state tort law. Although some states have eliminated such immunities, not all 
have. See Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1079, 1145 (2002).  
 111 See supra Part I.A-B.  
 112 As the Eleventh Circuit stated in Neal, “‘not every push or shove . . . violates [a 
person’s] constitutional rights.’” Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1076 (11th 
Cir. 2000) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). 
 113 See supra Part I. 
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol62/iss1/6
2014] DARK SARCASM IN THE CLASSROOM 147 
 
schools.”114 Moreover, the Supreme Court has underscored its deference to schools 
officials’ decisions with respect to disciplinary methods in particular, stating, “the 
appropriate means of maintaining school discipline is committed generally to the 
discretion of school authorities subject to state law.”115 Thus, the courts “refrain 
from second-guessing the disciplinary decisions made by school administrators.”116 
When disciplinary actions of public school officials include verbal or other 
reprimands that cause emotional discomfort, then, the courts are reluctant to 
intervene. They do not want to be in the business of parsing verbal reprimands that 
may have caused more than a little emotional discomfort. Any reprimand could 
cause some degree of emotional harm. Indeed, the intent of a reprimand can be, and 
often is, to cause emotional harm and thereby deter further misconduct on the part of 
students.  
The courts’ inclination to defer to schools’ disciplinary authority also, though, 
does not explain their distinct treatment of emotional harm. The courts have been 
willing to intervene in matters of student discipline when they have involved 
egregious physical force or physical harm.117 They do, therefore, sometimes step into 
matters involving schools’ disciplinary authority. That they do intervene at times, 
then, does not explain why they have never intervened when students suffer severe 
stand-alone emotional harm or why they do not fully assess emotional abuse and 
harm. It also does not explain why the courts have held emotional harm to an 
undefined torture standard in order to justify such intervention.  
B. An Alternative Explanation: Emotions Stigma 
The inadequacy of these rationales to explain the courts’ collective treatment of 
students’ emotional harm leaves a gap in understanding regarding why the courts 
treat students emotional harm differently than physical harm. The concept identified 
here as “emotions stigma” helps to fill this gap. Emotions stigma is drawn from the 
phenomenon of mental illness stigma but is broader because it encompasses 
skeptical or negative reactions to emotional harm generally even if it does not rise to 
the level of a diagnosable mental illness.118 Its operation is apparent in the federal 
                                                                                                                                            
 114 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).  
 115 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977). This authority even limits parents’ 
ability “unilaterally to except their children from the [discipline] regime to which other 
children are subject.” Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 610 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 116 Yap v. Oceanside Union Free Sch. Dist., 303 F. Supp. 2d 284, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(quoting Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999)).  
 117 See supra note 61.  
 118 In some cases, including cases involving substantive due process claims, emotions 
stigma may overlap almost entirely or entirely with mental illness stigma because the degree 
of severity required for emotional harm in the legal claim is so high. However, in other 
contexts the required amount of emotional harm may be much lower than the threshold for a 
diagnosable mental illness. For example, some child abuse laws address emotional harm that 
does not rise to the level of a diagnosable mental illness. In that and other similar contexts, 
emotions stigma could potentially still operate but not overlap very much, if at all, with mental 
illness stigma. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2202 (2012) (allowing a child to be taken into 
state care upon a showing of emotional harm with a showing of any particular level of 
emotional harm); LA. CHILD. CODE. ANN. art. 603 (2012) (defining “child abuse” as 
endangering the emotional health of the child without any level of severity required); MISS. 
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courts of appeals’ collectively distinct treatment of emotional harm in students’ 
substantive due process cases.  
1. Mental Illness Stigma and its Causes 
The field of psychology has long recognized and studied the causes and effects of 
mental illness stigma.119 In general, stigmas implicate “normative derivations in 
physical attributes, behavior, character.”120 They are “mark[s] of shame or 
discredit.”121 They represent “unwanted effects.”122 Mental illness stigma, then, 
represents the negative attributions and unwanted effects associated with people with 
mental illness.123 It consists of both the perceptions about and reactions to 
individuals with mental illness.124  
Research has shown the most common cause of mental illness stigma is 
attributions about its controllability.125 Lay individuals perceive that persons with 
mental illness can control their mental illnesses.126 Persons with mental illness are 
therefore perceived to be personally responsible for their mental illnesses because 
they have failed to exercise their own ability to control them.127  
A second component of mental illness stigma is social rejection or avoidance of 
individuals with mental illness. When individuals perceive that the mental illness is 
controllable, they exhibit little or no sympathy for the mentally ill individual and 
little or no desire to help the individual.128 They socially reject and want to avoid 
people with mental illness.129 This avoidance exists independently of perceptions 
                                                                                                                                            
CODE ANN. § 43-21-105 (2010) (defining an “abused” child as one who has suffered 
emotional abuse without any specific level of severity). 
 119 See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 20; P. Hayward & J.A. Bright, Stigma and Mental 
Illness: A Review and Critique, 6 J. MENTAL HEALTH 345 (1997); Ross M. G. Norman et al., 
The Role of Perceived Norms in the Stigmatization of Mental Illness, 43 SOC. PSYCHIATRY & 
PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 851 (2008); Daniel W. Socall & Thomas Holtgraves, The Effects 
of Label and Beliefs, 33 SOC. Q. 435 (2005); Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, supra note 20. 
 120 Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, supra note 20, at 738. 
 121 Stigma Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/stigma (last visited July 2, 2013). 
 122 Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, supra note 20, at 738. 
 123 Mental illness causes numerous unwanted effects, including “strained familial 
relationships, employment discrimination, and general social rejection.” Feldman, supra note 
20, at 138. 
 124 See Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, supra note 20. 
 125 See id.; Feldman, supra note 20. 
 126 See Feldman, supra note 20; Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, supra note 20. 
 127 See Feldman, supra note 20; Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, supra note 20. 
 128 Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, supra note 20, at 740 
 129 Feldman, supra note 20, at 138. The most common reason individuals with mental 
illness experience social distancing, social rejection, and punishment is that they are perceived 
to be personally responsible for their mental illness. Id. at 147. The opposite attribution and 
effect occur when injury or illness is physical in nature. When illnesses or injuries are 
perceived to be purely physical, individuals perceive they are not controllable. Weiner, Perry 
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regarding volatility or dangerousness of the individuals. The perception of 
dangerousness is a separate cause of mental illness stigma.130  
2. Emotions Stigma and its Dimensions 
An emotions stigma operates in the evaluation of public school students’ 
emotional harm in ways parallel to how mental illness stigma operates in society. 
Emotions stigma is the skeptical, sometimes negative, view of the operations of 
emotions and emotional harm that discredits emotions-based legal claims. Emotions 
stigma is reflected in one of two ways: a perception about or a reaction to an 
emotional harm or other emotions-based claims. More specifically, the perception is, 
as with mental illness stigma, that emotional harm is controllable by reason. The 
reaction, also as with mental illness stigma, is avoidance. The components do not 
need to work together to create the stigma. Either can discredit an emotional harm 
claim.  
Both the perception and reaction pieces of emotions stigma have historic roots 
and are evident in the evaluation of legal claims generally, perhaps most notably in 
torts. Historically, emotions and therefore emotional harm have been perceived as 
controllable by reason. In this component lies the skeptical view of the operation of 
emotions and emotional harm. If emotions are controllable, then they need not 
manifest in harm if the individual chooses otherwise. The avoidance reaction of 
emotions stigma is also rooted in history. Courts have a long history of reacting to 
emotions claims by avoiding their assessment. Together or on their own, these 
component parts of emotions stigma discredit emotions-based claims because they 
result in the claims not being heard on their own merits. 
a. The Perceived Controllability Component of Emotions Stigma 
The perception that individuals can control their own emotions has deep 
historical roots. It has affected understandings about the role of government, judges, 
and individual with respect to their own emotional harm. Summarizing the view of 
emotions, or passions, in the Federalist Papers, Doni Gewirtzman states, “Publius 
envisioned ‘passions’ as diametrically opposed to reason.”131 Publius saw reason as a 
mediating force on emotions, noting that “[w]hen men exercise their reason coolly 
and freely on a variety of distinct questions, they inevitably fall into different 
opinions on some of them.”132 Publius also went further to argue that government 
was responsible for controlling emotions, or passions, through reason. He asserted, 
“[b]ut it is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the 
government. The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the 
government.”133 
                                                                                                                                            
& Magnusson, supra note 20, at 741. The response based on this attribution, or perception, of 
uncontrollability tends to be sadness and pity for the ill or injured person. Id. Persons 
perceiving the illness or injury as physical and therefore uncontrollable will want to help those 
with the perceived physical illnesses or injuries. Id. 
 130 Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, supra note 20, at 740-41. 
 131 Gewirtzman, supra note 20, at 637. 
 132 THE FEDERALIST NO. 50. 
 133 THE FEDERALIST NO. 49. 
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By the Twentieth Century some voices argued against this vilification of 
emotions in favor of reason, particularly with respect to how judges evaluate 
cases.134 Justice Cardozo described the dominant view of reason as capable of 
“lift[ing judges] . . . above and beyond the sweep of perturbing and deflecting 
forces” such as “instincts and emotions and habits and convictions” in order to argue 
against it.135 Although Cardozo stated, “the great tides and currents which engulf the 
rest of men do not turn aside their course and pass the judges by,” he was himself 
fighting the tides of perception that reason could control emotions and therefore 
should serve as the sole guiding force in judicial decision making.136 Those 
perceptions persist into the present. No less a judicial figure than the current Chief 
Justice of the United States has asserted that his role in evaluating cases involves no 
emotion or other similar influences.137 
Reason has been seen as being capable of controlling the emotions not only of 
judges but also the individuals alleging emotional harm. This perceived 
controllability on the part of the individual is perhaps most obvious in the evaluation 
of emotional harm torts. The recognition of emotional harm as a tort occurred 
relatively recently in no small part because of a belief that it could be mitigated by 
the individual.138 Even as the law evolved in an ad hoc way to recognize at least 
some violations of emotional and mental distress in torts, though, the concept that 
reason could control that harm has persisted.139 As Nancy Levitt has noted, “mental 
                                                                                                                                            
 134 For a more comprehensive analysis of this understanding of reason as capable of 
controlling emotion in both government and the work of judges historically and into the 
present, see Maroney, Judicial Dispassion, supra note 20, at 634-40. 
 135 Brennan, supra note 20, at 5. 
 136 Id. (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 167-68 
(1921)). 
 137 Posner, supra note 20, at 1051. Justice John Roberts has likened his job to that of an 
umpire calling balls and strikes in a baseball game. Id. 
 138 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM, § 
SCOPE (2012). The policy concerns leading courts to refuse to allow recovery for emotional 
harms on their own, and therefore to not analyze those claims, included: 
(1) emotional harm is less objectively verifiable than physical harm and therefore 
easier for an individual to feign, to exaggerate, or to imagine; (2) emotional harm can 
be widespread—a single act can affect a substantial population; (3) some degree of 
emotional harm is endemic to living in society, and individuals must learn to accept 
and cope with such harm; (4) giving legal credence to and permitting recovery for 
emotional harm may increase its severity; and (5) related to the prior concern, while 
mitigation may be important in minimizing this harm, there is little a legal system can 
do to encourage or enforce mitigation. 
Id. 
 139 Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. 
REV. 1033, 1035 (1936) (“Quite apart from the question how far peace of mind is a good thing 
in itself, it would be quixotic indeed for the law to attempt a general securing of it. Against a 
large part of the frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments incident to participation 
in a community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection than the law 
could ever be.”). 
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harms are treated [by courts] as individually manufactured illnesses.”140 They are, 
therefore, discredited.  
b. The Avoidance Component of Emotions Stigma 
The second component of emotions stigma is, as with mental illness stigma, 
avoidance. More specifically, this component of emotions stigma is the judicial 
avoidance of or failure to engage with emotional harm.141 In the legal analysis of 
emotional harm, the avoidance is evidenced in the reluctance of courts to engage in a 
full, or at times any, analysis of emotional harm. Instead, courts have often relied on 
analyses of physical harm to draw conclusions about cases in which emotional harm 
is alleged.142 When faced with allegations of emotional harm, therefore, the courts’ 
reaction is to avoid them.  
As with the perception that reason can control emotions, this avoidance of 
assessing emotional harm also has historic roots and is apparent in tort. The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts acknowledges that courts have historically been 
reluctant to remedy emotional harm on its own without a physical harm element.143 
Courts have viewed stand-alone emotional harm so skeptically that it did not have 
legal value without a concomitant physical harm.144 The emotional harm could not 
be believed unless a physical harm verified it.145 Courts avoided the assessment of 
emotional harm on its own, then, by simply rejecting it.146 This rejection of course 
completely discredited the claims. 
c. Substantive Due Process Claims: Ripe for the Influence of Emotions Stigma 
Significantly, the evaluation of substantive due process claims is ripe for the 
influence of bias or emotionally imbued perspectives, including emotions stigma. 
Substantive due process represents one of the most nebulous areas for judicial 
evaluation. Scholars and jurists have written about the inevitability of,147 and the 
need for,148 the use of faculties such as intuition and emotion in the evaluation of 
these grey areas of law, or “zones of reasonableness.”149 In these areas intuition, 
                                                                                                                                            
 140 Levitt, supra note 74, at 175-76. 
 141 Avoidance here is, as with mental illness stigma, not tied to volatility or dangerousness. 
 142 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM, 
§ Scope (1965). 
 143 Id. The Restatement notes that “policy concerns often led courts to declare that actors 
had ‘no duty’ to prevent pure emotional harm, except in some narrowly defined areas.” 
 144 Id.; see also DOBBS, supra note 66, at §§ 302-03 (generally and with respect to 
intentional infliction of emotional distress torts); id. at § 308 (regarding negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claims). 
 145 See id.  
 146 Id.  
 147 Posner, supra note 20, at 1065-66. 
 148 Brennan, supra note 20, at 13. 
 149 Interestingly Posner, identifying emotions as a “form of thought,” declines to adopt the 
binary of reason versus emotions. Posner, supra note 20, at 1063. 
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emotions,150 and other not-purely rational forms of evaluation play a role because 
clear legal rules or precedent generally do not dictate outcomes.151 In the zone of 
reasonableness, the judge can make “a decision either way that can be defended 
persuasively, or at least plausibly, using the resources of judicial rhetoric.”152  
Nowhere is the zone of reasonableness wider than in constitutional decision-
making “because constitutional text provides little guidance and emotion opposes 
dispassionate consideration of the systemic factors that induce judges to rein in their 
discretion.”153 Taking the matter further, Justice Brennan even postulated that the 
due process clause in particular requires the injection of emotion, or “passion” as he 
called it, because the substantive due process clause’s very existence serves to 
“balance . . . the everyday exchanges between government and citizen.”154 That 
balance, he said, requires “draw[ing] on our own experience,” including our 
passions.155 
d. Emotions Stigma and Students’ Substantive Due Process Claims 
Emotions and faculties other than reason, then, have an impact on the judicial 
evaluation of matters falling into the zone of reasonableness in general and 
substantive due process in particular. In the context of students’ substantive due 
process claims, emotions stigma is one particular faculty at work. Both of the 
components of emotions stigma are reflected in the courts’ evaluations of students’ 
emotional harm. The first component, the perception that the individual can control 
emotions, is reflected in the courts’ use of the undefined torture standard. The second 
component, avoidance, is evidenced in the courts’ shallow analyses of students’ 
emotional harm. 
i. “Torture:” Code for Controllability  
The perceived controllability component of emotions stigma explains the 
undefined torture standard to which two Circuits have held students’ emotional harm 
in substantive due process cases. These courts have acknowledged that emotional 
harm on its own could potentially make out a Fourteenth Amendment violation, but 
only if it is tantamount to torture. Although the courts do not define their use of the 
term “torture” in the context of students’ substantive due process claims and no one 
definitive definition of torture exists,156 the definitions of “torture” generally involve 
a context where the victims do not have control over their treatment, such as during 
interrogations or imprisonment.157 This unifying characteristic suggests that when 
                                                                                                                                            
 150 Maroney, Common Sense, supra note 20, at 902. The interplay of emotion and reason in 
legal evaluation has also been described as “emotional common sense,” and it too comes into 
play in the zone of reasonableness. Id. 
 151 Posner, supra note 20, at 1053. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 1066.  
 154 Brennan, supra note 20, at 16.  
 155 Id. 
 156 MILLER, supra note 45, at 1. 
 157 Id. at 6, 15, 32. The United Nations Convention Against Torture defines torture within 
the context of interrogation and also discusses the definition of torture in the context in which 
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the courts “imagine” cases of emotional harm that amount to torture, they are 
reaching for scenarios where students are without control and cannot control their 
own harm. They are imagining potential cases where nothing—not even the 
students’ own reason—can overcome, or at least mitigate, their emotional harm.  
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ reliance on Rochin v. California in Abeyta and 
T.W. further supports this idea that the perceived controllability component of 
emotions stigma is at work in the undefined torture standard. Those courts both state 
that if some hypothetical students suffered emotional harm reaching the level of 
“torture” found in Rochin, then that kind of emotional abuse and harm might be 
unconstitutional. Although the Supreme Court never called the unconstitutional 
police actions in Rochin “torture,” and the police actions were physical in nature, the 
claimant in Rochin, significantly, had no control over his treatment.158 That the 
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits deem behavior that at its core involves a lack of control 
“torture” evidences the lack of control inherent in the conception of torture they 
applied to the students’ emotional harm in Abeyta and T.W.159 By seeking to find a 
lack of control and not defining how they will find it, courts discredit emotional 
harm claims. They heighten the proof required for emotional harm and thus mark the 
claims as less credible.160  
ii. Cursory Analyses of Emotional Harm and the Avoidance Component of Emotions 
Stigma 
The avoidance component of emotions stigma leaves students’ emotional harm in 
substantive due process cases barely assessed or not assessed at all. When presented 
with students’ emotional harm, the courts react by avoiding their assessment. They 
avoid assessing emotional harm by relying on the concomitantly alleged physical 
harm to determine the outcome of students’ substantive due process claims.161 The 
courts also avoid assessing students’ emotional harm by engaging in shallow 
analyses of it.162 In both situations, the courts do not justify their failure to fully 
address the emotional harm by explaining that they need not be reached or why.163 
They simply react by avoiding the students’ claims. 
                                                                                                                                            
an individual is taken hostage under the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Most, or all, 
of the definitions of torture assume some lack of control on the part of the person being 
tortured because of circumstances such as imprisonment or interrogation. See id. 
 158 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 166 (1952). In Rochin, the petitioner was suspected 
of selling narcotics. He was handcuffed and taken to the hospital where, at the direction of 
police, doctors pumped his stomach against his will. Id. 
 159 Abeyta ex rel. Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 77 F.3d 1253, 1257-
58 (10th Cir. 1996); T.W. v. Sch. Bd. of S. Seminole Cnty., 610 F.3d 588, 601-02 (11th Cir. 
2010). 
 160 Therefore, the emotional harm allegations are also harder to prove than physical harm 
allegations that do not require proof of this undefined standard. That said, arguably some 
emotional harm claims could meet torture standards outlined in other contexts. See MILLER, 
supra note 45. 
 161 See supra note 63. 
 162 See supra Part I.B. 
 163 See supra Part I.B. 
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If only one or two courts avoided analyzing students’ emotional harm, then 
emotions stigma would be a less plausible way of describing the courts’ avoidance 
reaction to it. The avoidance might be as easily described as an instance or two of 
shoddy opinion drafting.164 All the federal courts of appeals, however, have avoided 
the assessment of students’ emotional harm without a fully plausible basis.165 The 
consistency with which the federal courts of appeals avoid students’ emotional harm 
reflects that the avoidance is not about a particular court or case. The avoidance 
reaction is one that goes hand-in-hand with students’ emotional harm and is about 
the emotional harm itself.  
This unjustified avoidance across the federal courts of appeals discredits the 
claims as insignificant or otherwise unworthy of attention. It leaves little hope that 
students will prevail in substantive due process cases on the basis of emotional 
harm.166 If courts do not engage in any analysis of emotional harm, they will have 
difficulty concluding the harm is unconstitutional, particularly if the harm is held to 
an undefined torture standard.  
III. OVERCOMING EMOTIONS STIGMA AND ADDRESSING CONSTITUTIONAL 
EMOTIONAL HARM 
Naming emotions stigma and understanding that it can be at work in the 
evaluation of public schools students’ substantive due process claims only takes the 
matter so far. Overcoming its effects on the jurisprudential landscape also requires 
attention. For the courts to acknowledge that emotional as well as physical harm of 
students can violate the Constitution but to then never find it actually does is unfair, 
devalues the significance of students’ severe emotional harm, and is therefore 
untenable. When the State, through a school official, causes severe emotional harm 
to a student, it raises a constitutional matter. To begin to overcome emotions stigma, 
this Part proposes a paradigm for evaluating students’ emotional harm that works 
within the existing Hall analytic framework. Then, applying these factors, it explains 
how two cases of emotional harm, T.W. and Costello, should have come out 
differently. It also advocates for raising emotions stigma in the litigation of these 
cases.  
                                                                                                                                            
 164 Although only two Circuits have used the undefined torture standard with respect to 
students’ emotional harm, the relatively small number of courts using it does not indicate 
shoddy drafting. Because the courts affirmatively identify the undefined torture standard, their 
use of it is intentional, not inadvertent.  
 165 See supra Part II.A. 
 166 This veritable lack of a realistic chance of redress in the Constitution when school 
officials cause students severe emotional harm contrasts sharply with the great expansion of 
schools’ authority to punish students when the inflict emotional harm on other students. This 
expansion of authority has come in the form of electronic harassment or cyberbullying laws. 
All states, save one, have bullying laws, and the vast majority includes electronic harassment 
provisions, cyberbullying provisions, or both. Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, State 
CyberBullying Laws: A Brief Review of State Cyberbulling Laws and Policy, CYBERBULLYING 
RESEARCH CENTER, available at http://www.cyberbullying.us/Bullying_and_Cyberbullying_ 
Laws.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). A fuller analysis of this contrast, however, is the work of 
another article. 
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A. A New Paradigm for Evaluating Students’ Emotional Harm in Substantive Due 
Process Cases 
Counteracting the effects of emotions stigma in students’ substantive due process 
cases can begin to be accomplished in two ways. First, the language of the Hall 
analytic framework needs to change so the emphasis is not placed on “force.”167 
Second, the courts need to consider specific factors within each prong of that 
analytical framework when faced with allegations of emotional harm.  
1. Adjusting the Language of the Hall Framework  
The language of the Hall framework focuses on “force.” This language is 
significant because all but one of the federal courts of appeals that have found that 
students have a substantive due process right in school have taken their cues from 
Hall.168 The Hall standard calls for courts to evaluate “the force applied” in students’ 
substantive due process claims.169 The term “force” suggests something physical. It 
therefore encourages courts to focus on the physicality of the school official’s 
actions and physicality of the harm, potentially to the exclusion of any other kind of 
harm. It thus facilitates the avoidance component of emotions stigma by allowing 
courts to neglect allegations of emotional harm. The language of the test must be 
adjusted to ensure it does not facilitate emotions stigma. 
The Ninth Circuit provides a helpful example of such modification. Instead of 
assessing the state official’s “force,” the Ninth Circuit assesses “the governmental 
action in question.”170 Substituting the words “government action” for “force” is 
physicality-neutral and therefore better allows for consideration of forms of abuse 
other than physical. It better allows for consideration of emotional, verbal, 
psychological, and other non-physical abuse.  
2. Specific Factors for the Analysis  
The courts need to go further, though, and consider specific factors when 
analyzing students’ substantive due process claims based on allegations of emotional 
harm. When the Hall test first called for an assessment of “whether the force applied 
caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented, and was 
inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely unwise excess of zeal that it 
amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the 
conscience,” it did not identify specifically what kinds of needs could be considered 
legitimate, ways to assess proportionality, what kinds of injuries could be considered 
severe, and ways to identify maliciously or sadistically inspired behavior.171 The 
                                                                                                                                            
 167 The language of the test could be perceived as part of the root of the distinction in 
treatment of emotional abuse and harm and physical abuse and harm claims if it were not for 
the case of P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1996). There the court analyzed physical and 
emotional harm claims using a test that did not include language that connotes physicality. Id. 
In spite of that, the court still summarily analyzed the students’ emotional harm. Thus, the 
language of the test facilitates the problem but does not cause it, and changing the language 
alone will not completely solve the emotions stigma problem. 
 168 Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 169 Id. 
 170 P.B., 96 F.3d at 1304. 
 171 Hall, 621 F.2d at 613.  
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cases that have followed Hall have also failed to provide much specific guidance. 
Identifying factors for evaluating verbal and other non-physical government actions 
and harm and requiring courts to evaluate those factors would help overcome the 
avoidance component of emotions stigma. Leaving torture out of that mix would 
prevent it from being used by courts and would therefore counteract the perceived 
controllability component of emotions stigma.  
a. Factors Relevant in Considering the Need for Non-Physical Government Action 
To assess the need for verbal or other emotional abuse, the courts have to first 
identify whether there is any verbal or emotional abuse included in the government 
actions in question. The change in the language from “force” to “government action” 
will encourage, if not require, courts to consider verbal and other non-physical acts 
in their assessments of need. In addition, the courts need guidelines for determining 
the kinds of verbal and other non-physical acts that constitute emotional abuse. 
These guidelines must recognize that any school official who uses vulgar names, 
taunts, swears, or incites others to engage in any of those behaviors has verbally 
abused a student. In addition, a teacher’s taunts that incite the student to do harm to 
him- or herself, whether because it provoked the student to act out and be disciplined 
or to consider harming him- or herself, constitutes verbal abuse. These acts are 
verbal abuse because they constitute an abuse of power by an authority figure, are 
unnecessary, and are potentially or likely harmful words.172 The verbal abuse is only 
exacerbated if it occurs in front of other students because the harmful effects of the 
abuse are likely compounded by the embarrassment and shame that results from 
being abused in front of peers.  
When assessing need, the courts should also start with the rebuttable presumption 
that there is not a need for emotional abuse. This rebuttable presumption is 
justifiable because rarely, if ever, will the State be able to establish a legitimate need 
for emotional abuse of a child. Discipline does not require verbal or other forms of 
emotional abuse.173  
Instituting this rebuttable presumption does not mean that every instance of a 
teacher calling a student a vulgar name will constitute a substantive due process 
violation. One instance of calling a student a vulgar name will likely fail on the other 
prongs of the analytic framework, including proportionality and harm. A school 
official’s emotional abuse of students must nevertheless be assessed in light of its 
presumed lack of need because there is so little, if any, need for it. It will also ensure 
that when the emotional abuse does not fail the other prongs of the analysis, it is 
protected by the Constitution.  
                                                                                                                                            
 172 Harsh verbal discipline has been shown to be counterproductive in that it increases 
conduct problems and is associated with inducing depressive symptoms in adolescents. Ming-Te 
Wang & Sarah Kenny, Longitudinal Links Between Fathers’ and Mothers’ Harsh Verbal 
Discipline and Adolescents’ Conduct Problems and Depressive Symptoms, CHILD DEVELOPMENT 
10 (2013). In addition, the American Academy of Pediatrics recommends against using yelling 
or other strong verbal discipline because it is not necessary. Disciplining Your Child, AMERICAN 
ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS ONLINE, http://www.healthychildren.org/English/family-life/family- 
dynamics/communication-discipline/pages/Disciplining-Your-Child.aspx?nfstatus=401& 
nftoken=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000&nfstatusdescription=ERROR%3a+No+ 
local+ token (last visited Aug. 13, 2013).  
 173 Id.  
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b. Factors Relevant in Assessing the Proportionality of the Non-Physical 
Government Action  
In assessing the proportionality of verbal and other non-physical abuse, the 
courts need to consider both the severity and quantity of the verbal or non-physical 
abuse. The severity of the verbal or non-physical abuse should be determined by 
considering the general offensiveness of the words used. The more offensive and 
vulgar the words, the more severe they are. The word “jerk” is generally considered 
less severe an epithet than “asshole” because “asshole” is more vulgar.174 
In addition, the more precisely drawn the words are to the particularities of a 
student, the more severe they are. Calling an accomplished athlete a bad athlete is 
not particularly severe because so much evidence likely contradicts the term that it 
cannot be said to be precisely drawn to the particularities of the student. In contrast, 
calling a student with dyslexia “stupid” is more precisely drawn because it targets 
the student’s difficulties with academics and reading; therefore, it is more severe. 
Similarly, if a student has sensitivities known to the school official, exploiting those 
sensitivities should also constitute emotional abuse.  
Quantity must also be considered in assessing disproportionality. When there is 
no need for emotional abuse, the courts should again start with a presumption that 
the abuse was disproportionate.175 However, that presumption can be rebutted by 
evidence that the abuse happened in one isolated incident and was not very severe in 
kind. Repeated verbal or other emotional abuse increases its disproportionality.176 
c. Factors Relevant in Assessing the Severity of the Emotional Harm and Malice 
When looking at the severity of the emotional injury, courts first need to consider 
the harm from both emotional and physical abuse. As T.W. shows, both emotional 
and physical abuse can cause emotional harm.177 So if, in a case like T.W., the 
                                                                                                                                            
 174 In considering the vulgarity of a teacher’s student-directed speech, there surely is a level 
of intersection with First Amendment jurisprudence. In concluding the First Amendment did 
not protect a student who made a speech laced with sexual innuendo at a school assembly, the 
Supreme Court stated in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), stated, 
“it was perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils 
that vulgar speech is wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public school 
education.” Id. at 685-86. The intersectionality, then, involves not only the consideration of 
what constitutes vulgar speech (and if sexual innuendo is vulgar, then surely curse words are 
also vulgar), but also the juxtaposition of a school being able to punish for vulgar speech quite 
freely but not being liable when school official use vulgar speech and it causes severe 
emotional harm to students. This juxtaposition reflects another instance of schools’ legal 
authority being expanded and given deference while legal protections for students gets 
limited. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the 
Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527 (2000). 
 175 On the basis of this kind of disproportionality alone, the Sixth Circuit in Webb v. 
McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151 (6th Cir. 1987), found physical blows to a student to violate the 
Constitution. Id. at 1159. The Court stated, “[the] need . . . was so minimal or non-existent 
that the alleged blows were a brutal and inhumane abuse of McCullough's official power, 
literally shocking to the conscience.” Id. 
 176 While this point may seem obvious, it eluded the T.W. court. T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. 
Sch. Bd. of S. Seminole Cnty., 610 F.3d 588 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 177 Id. 
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physical abuse caused minimal physical harm, it should still be considered insofar as 
it may have caused emotional harm.  
Factors that tend to establish severity of emotional harm are those that show 
long-term, intractable, or irreparable harm or psychological regression. These kinds 
of harms include: new symptoms of psychological diagnoses; the exacerbation of 
any existing psychological disorder; any new (since the onset of abuse) and unusual 
emotional reactions to school, including crying and screaming; and any 
developmentally inappropriate behaviors.  
Finally, when determining whether the school official’s actions were inspired by 
malice or sadism, the courts should look into the subjective understandings of the 
school official as well as the objective facts. If the school official had reason to know 
that the treatment of the student would harm the student emotionally and did it 
anyway, then the school official has acted maliciously. Even if the school official did 
not know the actions would emotionally harm the student, though, severe actions (as 
determined by the proportionality prong of the analytic framework) can establish 
malice or sadism by their very severity.178 
B. The New Paradigm Applied: T.W. and Costello 
Applying these factors to two stand-alone emotional harm cases, T.W. and 
Costello, shows that they could and should have come out differently. T.W. is the 
case identified in this Article’s Introduction and discussed in Part I.179 Costello v. 
Mitchell Public School District 79 is an Eighth Circuit case in which the Court found 
that when a student, Sadonya Costello, suffered suicidal ideation and depression as a 
result of her teacher calling her “retarded,” “stupid,” and “dumb” repeatedly during 
her semester in his class, it did not violate the Constitution.180  
Including verbal taunts, vulgarity, swear words, and words that incite others to 
act against a student in the consideration of the “government action” would have 
started the courts in T.W. and Costello down different analytic paths than the ones 
they actually took. Considering these kinds of verbal abuse would have required the 
Court in T.W. to consider the teacher’s taunts and acts of calling T.W. “lazy,” 
“asshole,” “pig,” and telling him he stinks in its assessment of need.181 It would have 
required the Court in Costello to consider both the teacher’s actions in calling 
Sadonya “stupid,” “retarded,” and “dumb,” and the fact that he did it in front of her 
classmates.182  
After these considerations, the courts would then have to consider the need for 
this government action. Applying the rebuttable presumption that there is no need 
for verbal or non-physical abuse of students, the courts would have been unable to 
find the presumption overcome. In T.W. no evidence suggested any need—
                                                                                                                                            
 178 As the Fourth Circuit found in Meeker, a “fact-finder could certainly determine that 
such beatings . . . causing [the student] to suffer ‘excruciating physical pain, inflammation of 
the body,’ and ‘traumatic stress disorders,’” were “inspired by malice.” Meeker v. Edmunson, 
415 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 179 T.W., 610 F.3d 588. 
 180 Costello v. Mitchell Pub. Sch. Dist. 79, 266 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 181 T.W., 610 F.3d at 594. 
 182 Costello, 266 F.3d at 919.  
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disciplinary, pedagogical, or otherwise—for the teacher’s verbal abuse.183 In 
Costello, the teacher called Sadonya “dumb” and “retarded” for no apparent reason 
other than because she was struggling in school.184 Struggling in school merits 
attention and help from teachers; it does not create a need for verbal abuse.  
Without a need for the verbal abuse in T.W. and Costello, the courts could not 
have found proportionality between the need for the government action and the 
amount of it. When there is no need, there cannot be proportionality. Further, the 
State-imposed verbal abuse in both cases went on repeatedly for months, showing 
disproportionality based on quantity. The disproportionality was also exacerbated 
because the words were drawn to the particularities of the student. Calling T.W., 
who had intellectual and developmental disabilities, “stupid” targeted his 
disabilities.185 Calling Sandoya Costello “stupid” and “retarded” exploited both her 
academic difficulties and her status as a student who needed or had needed special 
education services.186  
If the courts considered the factors for assessing severity of harm called for in 
Part III(A)(2)(c) above, they could have found the harm suffered in T.W. and 
Costello severe. T.W. developed a new, long-term disability: PTSD.187 He regressed 
developmentally, including by starting to urinate in multiple places.188 Sadonya 
Costello also developed symptoms of new disabilities: depression and suicidal 
ideation.189 
The courts could have also found malice on the part of the school officials in 
both T.W. and Costello. In T.W. the malice could have been found because the 
teacher abusing T.W. knew from psychological evaluations that she could likely 
exacerbate his disabilities by her abuse, but she nonetheless engaged in it.190 
Although no evidence in Costello suggested that the teacher knew his actions were 
likely to cause depression and suicidal ideation in this particular student, the 
disproportionality between the need for his verbal abuse (none) and the severe abuse 
shows malice.  
In application, then, the factors making up the new paradigm for evaluating 
emotional harm in students’ substantive due process cases can work. They work by 
requiring courts to not only consider emotional harm, but also consider it effectively 
and without reference to unhelpful and vague standards. They work, therefore, by 
overcoming emotions stigma.  
C. Recognizing the Role of Emotions Stigma in Litigation 
In order to overcome emotions stigma, it must be recognized as it occurs. In the 
process of litigating cases, the work of alerting judges to issues that need to be 
                                                                                                                                            
 183 T.W., 610 F.3d at 594-96.  
 184 Costello, 266 F.3d at 919. 
 185 T.W., 610 F.3d at 594. 
 186 Costello, 266 F.3d at 919. 
 187 T.W., 610 F.3d at 596. 
 188 Id.  
 189 Costello, 266 F.3d at 920. 
 190 T.W., 610 F.3d at 608 n.6. 
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addressed falls to the lawyers and litigants. While judges surely should be alert to 
their own biases and analytic missteps, they may also miss them.191 The role of the 
lawyer is to ensure that judges do not miss points relevant to their analyses. 
Attorneys then should alert judges that emotions stigma can play a role in the 
evaluation of students’ emotional harm allegations in substantive due process cases. 
Indeed, attorneys have an obligation to point out emotions stigma on behalf of their 
clients in order to ensure that it does not play a role in harming the evaluation of 
their claims. 
Suggesting to a judge that he or she may apply a stigma about emotions in a case, 
however, could be a tricky business. Lawyers understandably may not want to 
offend courts by appearing to presumptuously assert that judges may apply a bias or 
stigma to the analysis of the case. If Chief Justice John Roberts serves as any 
example, such a suggestion may offend judges’ most basic sense of their role and 
how they act in that role.192  
One way to alert courts to the potential role of emotions stigma is to point out 
that it has played a role in other courts’ evaluations of students’ emotional abuse and 
harm claims. In this way, the lawyer can make the argument without directly 
suggesting that emotions stigma might play a role in evaluations by the particular 
courts before which they are appearing. In addition, attorneys should argue that the 
result of emotions stigma has been to contribute to, or cause the failure of, any court 
to recognize that emotional harm, no matter its severity, can on its own violate 
students’ substantive due process rights. Attorneys can thereby allow the courts to 
understand the problematic jurisprudential landscape that has been created by 
emotions stigma so other courts can avoid contributing to it. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paradigm and related steps are envisioned as a starting point for addressing 
and overcoming emotions stigma in the evaluation of students’ substantive due 
process claims. Addressing emotions stigma involves addressing deeply historic 
perceptions about the interaction of emotions and reason. It requires courts to begin 
to meaningfully evaluate students’ allegations of emotional harm absent any physical 
harm component. It also requires them to abandon meaningless torture standards 
applied only to emotional, but not physical, harm. Yet, a start needs to be made. 
Failing to address the operation of emotions stigma will leave the jurisprudential 
landscape as is. Students like T.W., who must go to school in order to comply with 
compulsory attendance laws, will continue to suffer severe, State-imposed emotional 
harms, and the Constitution will not be offended. The Constitution will simply 
                                                                                                                                            
 191 Assumptions, a category similar to emotions stigma and stigmas generally, are 
notoriously easy to miss because they are “taken for granted.” Assumption Definition, 
WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/assumptions (last 
visited July 2, 2013). They therefore get applied entirely or almost entirely without thought. 
So too emotions stigmas can lie below the intellectual surface and be missed. 
 192 In his Senate confirmation hearings, the Chief Justice described his role as a judge as 
analogous to that of an umpire calling strikes and balls in baseball. Posner, supra note 20, at 
1051. While other judges and scholars have pointed out the fallacy of that analogy, because 
Justice Roberts used it in reference to himself in no more serious a forum than his own 
confirmation hearings, it is reasonable to conclude he believes it or at least wants it to be true 
about himself.  
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continue to fail to protect public school students from even very severe emotional 
harm in school. 
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